Slokavarttika of Kumarila. In this Bahirarthapariksa also mainly there quoted a few verses from Sanyavada and (1) criticized thoroughly by Santaraksita.
I treated that the most basic standpoint found in this Bahirarthapariksa (2) belonged to one of vijnanavZidas. Vijnana held by him is that which is endless and impure for persons who have not realized the truth yet, but pure for those who have cut off their obstacles. Besides, it is one which all beings depend upon, and which is destroyed at every moment. The triple world is only such vijnana. Then, why is the triple world mere vi jnana?
(1) As to the meaning of Sunyavada itself, see Yamazaki, T.; "On 'Sunyavada' Quoted in Slokavarttika" (Journal of Indian & Buddhist Studies. Vol. 5. No. 2.) (2) Cf. My "The Examination of the External Object in the Tattvasamgraha" (Journal of Indian & Buddhist Studies. Vol. 10, No. 2).
On Self-cognition (Svasamvedana) in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma) (69) It is because nothing exists, Santaraksita says, except vijnana which is "self -cogniser'. He does not admit the realistic existence of the external objects at all. If the external object is recognised, according to him, it may be recognised either by the formless cognition (nirakaravijnana), or by the cognition having a similar form (sakaravijnana), or the cognition endowed with a different form from its objects (anyakaravijnana). But he accepts neither the nirakaravijnanavada, nor the sakaravijnanavada, nor the
anyakaravijnanavada. Kamalasiila, commentator on this work, summarizes these into the following argument:
Every cognition is devoid of both 'the cognised' and 'the cogniser'.
Because it is cognition. (4) Just like the cognition of the reflected image.
Thus, for Santaraksita, cognition (jnana) is fundamentally devoid of the cognised (grahya) and the cogniser (grahaka). That is to say, it has (5) only nature of 'cognition'.
Consequently the concept of 'svasamvedana' comes to have very important meaning in his vijnana-system. At first Santaraksita formulates a general difinition of svasamvedana as follows:
Cognition (vijnana, rnam-ses) is produced as differentiated from all the unconscious natures (jadarupa, bems-pohi ran-bshin), when it is produced; it is this fact of its no-unconscious (ajada, bems-min) that consti-
tutes its self-cognition (atmasamvitti, bdag-nid-ses-pa 
ran-rig-pa). According to him, cognition is the illumination of its own by its nature. In order to illuminate itself, cognition never need any other things than itself.
It is to this point that Kumarila, Mimamsaka, objects. He says: while it is operating towards the recognising of an object (arthasamvitti, donrtogs), a cognition (jnana, ses-pa) does not touch itself. Hence, even though it is illuminative (prakasatve'pi, gsal-byed-nid yin-pas), it depends upon something else (anyat pratiksate, gshan-la bltos-pa) for its own apprehension (bodhaYa, rtogs-phyir).
Even though a cognition is of illuminative nature, it does not illuminate itself. It is because, when it is engaged in one thing, it cannot operate over another thing, without abondoing the former. In other words, cognition cannot recognise itself, when it is engaged in the act of recognising an object. And when a cognition comes into existence, it recognises some object necessarily. Therefore cognition never cognise itself.
Santaraksita criticizes to this insistence of Kumarila in 2017-2020 verses. It is the cognition of the object (arthasya samvittih, don-la rnampar-rig-pa) that is called 'cognition' (jnana, ses-pa). Then, when it forms its own essence, how could there be any other function (vyapara, bya-ba) (9) over it? The cognition of an object (arthasamvitti) is of the nature of cognition. They are not distinguishable from each other. Kamalasila explains that it is the cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms
rnam-par-rig-pa) and vijnapti. As cognition of an object is not distinguishable from the cognition, no other cognitive act is needed for cognising of the object. These are formulated into following argument byKamalasila:
Every cognition does not depend upon the operation of anything else On Self-cognition (Svasamvedana) in the Tattvasamgraha(A. Suganuma) (71) for its own cogniton.
Because it is cognition. (11) Just like the final cognition of the series.
It is very important that there are two examples of the same reason (hetu), "because it is cognition" (jnanatvat) to two propositions (pratijna). That is, one is "every cognition is devoid of both the cognised and the cogniser" and the other is "every cognition does not depend upon the operation of anything else for its own cognition".
But Kumarila does not admit Eantaraksita's maintenance. The illuminative character (prakasatva, gsal-ba-nid) of cognition may be regarded as consisting in its being apprehension of an object (arthanubhavatmaka, don bdag-nid nams-myon). But as there is no apprehension of itself (atmanubhava, bdag-nid nams-myoin), the cognition cannot be regarded as illuminating itself. As in the case of the eye, even though it is illuminative (sati prakasatve'pi), yet it has its illuminativeness restricted to colour (12) (rupa), so it would be in the case of the cognition also. Santaraksita's answer to this is as follows: The eye is regarded as illuminative (prakasa, gsal-byed), not because it is its apprehension, but because it causes to happen the r cognition (vijfiana, rnam-ses) of colour.
Then what similarity (upama, mtshuns) can the eye have to the cognition? Thus Kumarila's assertion consisting in similarity of the eye is pointed out its absurdity. But he assert further that the illuminativeness (prakasatva) of cognition operates upon the external object (bahyartha), and not (14) upon cognition itself, because of want of the capacity (saktyabhavat).
This assertion is criticised also by $antaraksita. The essential nature of an object is 'apprehension' (anubhaia, nams-myon). It is not distinguishable (72) On Self-cognition (Svasamvedana) in the Tattvasamgraha (A. Suganuma) from cognition. Otherwise the cognition cannot operate upon it. If the object is distinguishable from the cognition, it cannot be apprehended at all. As it does not differ from it, the cognition apprehends itself. Hence it is quite clear that Kumarila's wrong assertion comes from his standpoint which distinguishes the cognition from the apprehension of its object.
According to Santaraksita, Self-cognition (svasamvedana) is the essential nature of cognition (jnana). Concretely speaking, it does not depenp upon something else for its own cognition. Besides, fundamentally it is devoid of both the cognised (grahya) and the cogniser (grahaka). So he concludes that primarily (mukhyatas, gtso-bor) cognition does not apprehend an object at all, because it abides within its own self (svasvabhavasthiti, ran-gi ran-bshin-la-gnas-pa), and because there is absence of (15) the imprint of the objective forms. This is made clear by Kamalasila. He says: "When cognition is said to be self-cognition (atmasamvedana), it is (16) not regarded as the cognised (grahya) and the cogniser (grahaka). It is (17) meant that it shines itself by itself by its nature". Then, why is cognition, not regarded as the cognised and the cogniser ? There can be no self-cognition-(svasamvitti, ran-gi rig-pa) of the cognition in the sense that it is the action and the active agency (kriyakaraka, bya dais byed-pa), because one and the same thing which is impartite in form (anamsarupa, cha-med-ran-bshin) cannot have three characters (trairupya, gsum-gyi rain-(18) bshin). Three characters, in this case, are of the cognised (vedya), the cogniser (vedaka) and the cognition (vitti). One and impartite cognition cannot have such three characters at the same time. Consequently we can understand that his 'self-cognition' (svasamvedana) differs from one of the so-called 'theory that cognition has three characters'. It is never possible for him that cognition has such characters as the cognised, the cogniser and the cognition. The cognition is only of undivided character. 
matr and pramana. Santaraksita never admit the realistic existence of these characters, but regards cognition as the undivided. Therefore 'self-cognition' asserted by him is different from that in 'the theory that cognition has three divisions' which have held by the traditional vijnanavadin in China and Japan. Consequently, even though the usage 'self-cognition'
(svasamvedana, atmasamvedana, etc.) was used in this work, it is quite impossible to conclude that Santaraksita's vijnanavada stands on such 'theory that cognition has three divisions'. In other words, 'self-cognition (svasamvedana) is not one of these three divisions of cognition in Santaraksita's vijnana system. His 'self-cognition' represents to be the unity of the cognition. And his vijnanavada seems to stand on this unity of the cognition.
Thus in Santaraksita's vijnana-system, cognition is one which is devoid of the cognised and the cogniser, which is neither having form, nor formless, and which is one and impartite. Cognition, in actuality, is apprehending the non-objective form (abhuta-akara, yarn-dag-min rnampa), only through falsefood (vibhrama, hkhrul-pa), but in reality it does not apprehend it at all, for the simple reason that it has no object (nir-
visaya, yul-med-pa 
